In this paper, we explain why donating to stem cell research specifically, and to embryo research more generally, fresh embryos suitable for transfer (i.e., "healthy" fresh embryos) is not in the self-interests of female IVF patients. 11 Next, we consider the other-regarding interests of these patients and conclude that while fresh embryo donation may serve those interests, it does so at unnecessary cost to patients' self-interests. Lastly, we review some of the potential barriers to the autonomous donation of fresh embryos to research and highlight the risk that female IVF patients invited to donate their excess fresh embryos to research will misunderstand key aspects of the donation decision, be coerced to donate, or be exploited in the consent process. For the frozen, were originally created for reproductive purposes and are no longer required for such purposes' (emphasis added). 15 We think that IVF physicians should decline such requests, because accepting them would require that they act in a manner inconsistent with their obligation to protect and promote patients' interests.
Self-interests
Current live birth rates with IVF are such that any one IVF cycle probably will not result in a live birth (as live birth rates per cycle are less than 50%, and often substantially less than 50%). Thus, patients determined to reproduce using IVF likely will need a subsequent cycle, and Third, donating fresh embryos to research could mean more psychological stress for patients than they would otherwise experience. Women in general report higher levels of psychological stress from IVF than men, presumably because they have more invested in the outcome (including their self-image, their time, and their physical well-being). 22 Arguably, an IVF cycle that includes ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval is more stressful psychologically for women than a cycle using frozen-thawed embryos. The added effort and risk involved in a cycle using fresh embryos can make it all the more difficult to await the outcome of treatment, knowing that if it does not work, they will have done it all for nothing.
A fourth reason why fresh embryo donation can violate women's interests is that typically a IVF cycle that involves ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval is more socially disruptive than a cycle using frozen-thawed embryos because of the daily blood tests and routine ultrasounds involved. The blood tests typically occur in the early morning (around 7am) and if the women also need an ultrasound that day, then they may have to wait around or make a return visit. For women who work outside of the home or who have children at home to care for, frequent early morning blood tests and ultrasounds are difficult to schedule, especially for those women who have to travel great distances to get to these appointments.
Lastly, donating fresh embryos to research is problematic insofar as it is contrary to the financial interests of many patients. An IVF cycle that involves ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval is more expensive than an IVF cycle using frozen-thawed embryos, even when the additional cost of embryo freezing is taken into account. With a frozen-thawed embryo cycle, one typically avoids the expense of sperm collection, sperm-washing, ovarian stimulation, and egg retrieval, as well as associated clinic and physician charges. One study estimates the cost saving with frozen-thawed embryo transfer at between 55-75% as compared with other assisted reproductive procedures.
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Thus, for many patients, donating fresh embryos to research is not in their self-interests.
It is not in their reproductive self-interest; not in their interest in maintaining their overall physical and mental health; not in their career or family interests; and likely also not in their financial interests. Overall, for their own sakes, patients are better off freezing their excess fresh 12 embryos, rather than donating them to research. The overwhelming majority of women seem to recognize this fact; rates of embryo freezing are as high as 99%.
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The only possible caveat here is that donating excess fresh embryos to stem cell research may be in patients' self-interests if they are (or believe themselves to be) at risk for one of the medical problems for which stem cell research may lead to effective treatment. We do not explore this possible future self-interest in this section of the paper, not because it is unimportant, but because at best it would be secondary to the primary self-interest in initiating a pregnancy.
Our analysis of this secondary self-interest parallels our analysis below of other-regarding interests (which we also consider secondary to the primary self-interest in initiating a pregnancy).
Since fresh embryo donation to research goes against the self-interests of most women undergoing IVF, it is worth asking why stem cell researchers would expect patients to donate fresh embryos in sufficient numbers to allow them to undertake the research they are interested in. Perhaps they do not (or choose not to) accept that these embryos have reproductive potential.
Or, they expect that fresh embryo donation will cohere with patients' other-regarding interests,
and that patients will allow these interests to outweigh or supersede their self-interests. In other words, perhaps stem cell researchers (and IVF physicians) assume that women undergoing IVF will be altruistic and sacrifice their self-interest(s) to help others. But why make this assumption?
Other-regarding interests
Usually, when people make big sacrifices, they do so for people with whom they have some affinity. In the context of health care that affinity might be shared membership in a 'disease' The upshot of this discussion about women's interests-self-and other-regarding-is that it is perfectly reasonable for women to be self-interested when faced with the option of donating their fresh embryos to stem cell research (where their self-interest demands that they not take this option). Moreover, it is unreasonable for others to expect women to act any differently. Our view is not that altruism in this domain is impossible, or would always be morally unacceptable, but simply that researchers (and IVF physicians) should not expect women to have such otherregarding interests. Nor should they invite them to act against their self-interests.
POSSIBLE BARRIERS TO AUTONOMOUS DONATION
In response to our claim that fresh embryo donation is contrary to the self-and other-regarding interests of women, some stem cell researchers and IVF physicians might insist that there are patients ready and willing to donate their fresh embryos to stem cell research. For these donations to be fully autonomous, however, they would have to be made with full understanding and without coercion or exploitation. Below, we dispute each of these possibilities.
Misunderstanding
Misunderstanding that results in mistaken beliefs can thwart autonomous decision making, as happens with: i) patients who mistakenly believe that fresh embryo donation is in their reproductive interests; ii) patients who understand that fresh embryo donation generally is not in the reproductive interests of women in an IVF program, but who mistakenly believe that they are not to be counted among these women because they are in their 'last' cycle of IVF; and iii) patients who mistakenly believe that they are obligated to be altruistic and donate their excess fresh embryos to research. with pregnancy and motherhood. The latter could make it impossible for women even to recognize themselves as women if they were to accept that they had a serious fertility problem.
As a consequence, they may not accept this fact and may be overly optimistic about IVF. For some women, accepting either or both of these things is tantamount to admitting that they will never attain true womanhood and will never have good lives.
A further reason why some women may believe they are finished with IVF is that they no longer have the money to pursue their reproductive dream. IVF is costly. For some patients one IVF cycle will represent their entire life savings. Other patients may have more disposable
income, yet have reached the limit of what they are prepared to invest in their reproductive project. In either case, financial circumstances or beliefs could change, making it possible to proceed with one or more future IVF cycles (each of which would be less costly if there were frozen embryos available for thawing and transfer).
In summary, women could want to donate fresh embryos to research because, for any number of reasons, they mistakenly believe that they are done with IVF and so will not need frozen embryos for future reproductive purposes.
Lastly, patients willing to donate fresh embryos to research could be mistaken in their belief that they are morally obligated to donate. Patients might assume that they ought to donate their excess fresh embryos because doing so would benefit humanity and they are morally obligated to act so as to benefit humanity, even at some risk to themselves. But we know from our previous discussion about altruism that donations of fresh embryos to stem cell research by patients is not the only (or perhaps even the best) way to proceed with this research and patients would be wrong to assume otherwise. Moral philosophy also tells us that whether people are morally required to help others while putting their own well-being at risk is complicated. understanding key aspects of the decision of whether to donate their fresh embryos to research.
Failing to see that donation is not connected with reproduction, believing in error that one is truly done with IVF, or wrongly assuming that one is morally required to donate fresh embryos to research can prevent patients from truly knowing whether donation fits with their autonomous desires.
Coercion
Patients may fully understand everything that is relevant to a decision to donate fresh embryos to stem cell research, and still not choose autonomously because they are coerced. The coercion may be the result of a coercive offer or of a threat of harm.
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To be coerced is to be compelled to accept and possibly act upon a proposal (e.g., to donate fresh embryos to stem cell research) on the grounds that failure to do so would worsen one's situation relative to the pre-proposal situation (a non-normative baseline of comparison) or to a situation that is fair (a normative baseline). The proposal-whether intentional or unintentional-alters or influences the will of the person coerced, making her choose differently than she otherwise would, it being rational or necessary for her to do what the coercer wants her to do. 35 Not everyone agrees that coercion can be the result of an offer rather than a threat, but we find In practice, the coercer can be an institution or an institutionalized set of social norms rather than an actual person. 36 Following Ann Cudd, we call such coercion simply, 'institutional coercion.' Sometimes people have trouble identifying institutional coercion because they take the relevant institutions or norms for granted (i.e., as simply the way things are), as many people do, for example, with the institutions of motherhood and heterosexuality. Widespread acceptance of institutionalized norms in no way diminishes their coercive effect, however.
Further, for there to be coercion, the offer or threat need not be real in the sense that the person's circumstances really would improve if she responded to the offer, or worsen if she failed to respond to the threat. The offer or threat need only be credible and compelling to the person for there to be coercion. For example, an offer or threat could be a bluff, yet still have a coercive effect.
Finally, coercion is prima facie wrong because it violates autonomy. People who are coerced do not choose freely, although they may make choices (e.g., the choice to save their skins by complying with a particular threat).
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In this paper, we focus on threats of abandonment (i.e. by one's physician or other care providers) and threats of stereotyping, both of which could coerce women to donate fresh embryos for research. These threats most likely stem from social norms and structures, although they could also issue from individuals, most notably physicians (and other care providers) or researchers. Moreover, the threat of being abandoned is perhaps most common, or most severe, No matter who asks the patient about fresh embryo donation, therefore, the patient might reason that if she does not consent to the donation, then her physician will abandon her as a patient or treat her less well than s/he otherwise would. But why might a patient think that she will be abandoned? We give two possible reasons. 1) She might assume that her physician would not ask her about fresh embryo donation, or direct her to a researcher who would ask her to consent to embryonic stem cell research (or have a nurse or other care provider direct her to such a researcher), if the physician did not believe that donating was a reasonable (possibly even good) thing to do. This assumption would flow from the commonly held view that physicians only have their patients' best interests in mind and at heart. 2) Patients might know that the treatment they are receiving is elective, which suggests that they do not have the same right to it as they do to medically necessary therapies and that their physicians are not under the same obligation to provide it. Also, many patients may not have other physicians to turn to, especially if there is only one fertility clinic in their area. Taken together these thoughts could help to form a strong desire in patients to be compliant with what they take to be the physician's own view, namely, that fresh embryo donation is a reasonable (possibly even good) thing to do. These thoughts also make a threat of abandonment credible, although the threat may not be real.
Patients who respond to such a perceived threat in deciding to donate their fresh embryos to research are coerced.
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The threat of abandonment, as we have described it, arises out of social norms and structures. But the behaviour of physicians and other care providers could also enhance (or diminish) this threat. For example, it matters how a physician or other care provider presents a proposal for donating fresh embryos to research, or presents a proposal for the patient to talk with a stem cell researcher who wants to obtain fresh embryos. Does s/he make it sound as though fresh embryo donation is something that patients ought to accept? Further, does the culture of the clinic bolster the perceived threat? For example, if physicians, nurses and other clinic staff tend to expect compliance (and label patients 'non-compliant' or 'problem patients' if they are demanding or questioning), then the perceived (or real) threat of abandonment for refusing a certain option or recommendation may be high.
Stereotyping by physicians or researchers is another potential threat that might compel patients to donate fresh embryos to research. 38 Like the threat of abandonment, the perception of a stereotype threat here begins with the assumption that the physician, or in this case perhaps the researcher, favours donation because it is a rational, praiseworthy thing to do. On this assumption, women who do not donate are at risk of being labeled 'hormonal,' that is, irrational or overly emotional. The threat of this stereotype is unusually high in fertility treatment because of the hormone medication(s) that women take. In an effort to avoid this stereotype, patients may respond positively to the 'rational' proposal that they donate their fresh embryos to research.
Another stereotype that might compel patients to donate fresh embryos to research is that of the selfless woman, dedicated to caring for others. Here, the goal is not to avoid the stereotype, but 38 On stereotype threats, see C. Steele. A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance. Am Psychol 1997; 52, 6: 613-629.
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rather to satisfy it. Patients can achieve this by donating their fresh embryos to research, which shows substantial concern for others.
But why assume that many patients in fertility treatment would perceive themselves to be at serious risk of animating stereotypes, especially with their physician, with whom they presumably have a meaningful relationship, at least compared to what they have with a researcher? Stereotypes prevail more easily in the absence of meaningful relationships. (To illustrate, we often stereotype strangers and cease to do so only once they cease to be strangers to us.) Unfortunately, however, one cannot assume that patients undergoing fertility treatment usually have meaningful relationships with their physician; in fact, there is good reason to believe that in general, these relationships are quite poor. One study in Finland shows that for women who are dissatisfied with fertility treatment, the greatest source of dissatisfaction is their relationship with their physician: s/he did not spend enough time with them, was not empathetic enough, did not understand their particular worries and concerns, etc. 39 In some cases, the dissatisfaction came from the team approach to fertility treatment, in which patients receive care most of the time from a team of physicians and nurses rather than from one particular physician or nurse. With this approach, patients often do not know who will provide what care when: they may get a different physician every day or every other day that they go in for an ultrasound to monitor their follicle production; and they may get a different nurse every day calling them to tell them their blood test results. The team approach, which is common in fertility clinics, can benefit patients to be sure (e.g. by allowing them to get treatment quicker than they otherwise would); but it also denies patients the ability to have a relationship, of any meaningful sort, with 
Exploitation
Agreements that IVF patients make to donate fresh embryos to stem cell research can be purely coercive. But they can also be exploitative and coercive. With the latter, we have in mind agreements that take unfair advantage of how beholden some patients feel to their IVF physicians and who donate their fresh embryos as a way of giving back to their physicians.
These patients may have a strong desire to donate; yet their desire may originate or be influenced by coercive forces in our society (as illustrated below). Coercion can make us go against our immediate desires, as it does in the case of patients who would rather not donate their fresh embryos to research, but who do so anyway to avoid abandonment or stereotyping. Or, coercion can explain, in part or in whole, why we have some of the immediate desires that we do: we were coerced into having them, even though we may not now recognize this fact. The latter sort of coercion, combined with exploitation, is a further potential barrier to women autonomously donating their fresh embryos to stem cell research.
Assuming we already understand coercion, let us explore the meaning of exploitation briefly. Exploitation involves taking unfair advantage of someone. If you are taking unfair 26 advantage, then you, the exploiter, must benefit. By contrast, the person you exploit either receives no (net) benefit or some benefit but not what she deserves. In the former case, the exploitation is harmful and in the latter, it is mutually advantageous, that is, relative to a baseline of non-cooperation. 40 Exploitation that is mutually advantageous is not advantageous to both parties in a way that is fair, as happens, for example, when the person exploited was in a vulnerable position to begin with (e.g., she was oppressed or impoverished), did not deserve to be in this position, and her vulnerability explains why she agrees to cooperate in the first place.
While relative to her initial circumstances, she benefits from cooperating with the person who ultimately exploits her, relative to circumstances that are fair, she does not benefit to the degree that she ought to. Intense feelings of gratitude would be common in these cases. But such feelings could also arise among patients who have to pay for the treatment themselves. They might feel beholden because of a deep desire to get pregnant and a perception of their physician as a saviour to them-that is, someone who will rescue them from an 'empty, childless life.' Some physicians encourage this perception of themselves when they are optimistic with patients about being able to 'cure' them.
Patients who donate fresh embryos out of a sense of indebtedness benefit in being relieved of their perceived debt. But this benefit may not outweigh the harm that they experience (i.e. to their reproductive goals and to their overall physical and mental health), in which case, the agreement to donate would be harmful to them. Alternatively, the agreement could be mutually advantageous, as it is when the benefit of expressing their gratitude outweighs the harm that may ensue as a result of the decision to donate.
Why assume patients who benefit from donating fresh embryos to research to relieve their feelings of indebtedness are exploited in the process? Surely, not all agreements that are born out of indebtedness are exploitative. We agree. But when feelings of indebtedness are morally inappropriate or unjust (as with patients who do not deserve to feel indebted), people who take advantage of them to secure an agreement take unfair advantage of another's vulnerabilities. Some women may feel beholden enough to be willing to donate fresh embryos to research only because of an intense desire to reproduce that comes from an oppressed and coerced self-image. They were coerced into believing that they are not real women if they cannot reproduce. So a desire that is a product of coercion fuels their sense of indebtedness and explains why they donate. Here, they are taken advantage of in their vulnerable state of having internalized a social mandate of reproduction for women. They are exploited because the advantage taken is unfair. The only potential benefit they receive is relief from a sense of indebtedness that is not authentic to them anyway. As such, one could argue that the women receive no real benefit, while the researchers clearly benefit; and therefore, the agreements that the women make with them must be exploitative. Thus, exploitation combined with a certain form of coercion is a possible barrier to women autonomously donating their fresh embryos to research. This barrier adds another layer-on top of misunderstanding and other forms of coercion-to the difficulty involved in having women make informed, autonomous choices about donating excess fresh embryos to stem cell research. At the present time, such evidence is definitely lacking; we do not know whether fresh embryos in general are better than frozen-thawed embryos for this purpose, although we do know that fresh embryos deemed unsuitable for transfer are worse than frozen-thawed embryos in this regard. 43 From the perspective of evidence-based research therefore, only frozen-thawed embryos ought to be used for stem cell research. We have reached the same conclusion from an ethics perspective, and more particularly, from the perspective of patients. We have focused on donating fresh embryos suitable for transfer (i.e., "healthy" embryos) to stem cell research, and argued that such donations violate women's self-and other-regarding interests, and that profound barriers exist to women making these donations in an autonomous fashion.
THE POSSIBILITY OF AUTONOMOUS DONATION OF EXCESS FRESH EMBRYOS
One might object to our claims about autonomy and insist that some patients will not misunderstand, be coerced or be exploited and that these patients ought to have the opportunity to donate their fresh embryos to stem cell research (whether suitable or unsuitable for transfer), provided that they perceive donation to be in their interests. Our response to this objection is twofold. First, the prospects of being able to identify the few patients who either are not subject to the above barriers to autonomy or could overcome them are dim. Second, the objection assumes that patients expressly prefer to donate fresh rather than frozen embryos; yet there are no grounds for this assumption. In fact, it would be most unusual for women who are fully informed to have this preference, even if they were staunch supporters of embryonic stem cell 42 Ethics Committee of the ASRM, op. cit. note 27.
43 Sjögren et al, op. cit. note 7. 30 research, given that the goals of stem cell research could be achieved without their fresh embryos and thus without them having to incur the possible additional harms associated with fresh embryo donation. Importantly, the claim that research goals could be achieved without using fresh embryos would continue to be true if it were shown that human embryonic stem cell derivation was more efficient when using fresh embryos. Sometimes the most efficient option is not the most ethically sound option.
In closing, others have acknowledged that the consent process for the donation of fresh embryos to research is complicated; 44 but we go further in this paper and argue that the process is so fraught with difficulties that it simply ought not to take place. As we have shown, the barriers to autonomous decision-making are too severe; and, perhaps more importantly, fresh embryo donation is contrary to the interests of female infertility patients and furthers their oppression.
Women's interests are best served and their autonomy best promoted if they have the time and distance from their IVF treatment that would allow them to reflect carefully on whether they want to donate excess embryos to research (as happens with the usual delay when patients donate frozen embryos to research). Studies show that with time and distance, women often withdraw prior consent to donating frozen embryos to research or simply do not give final consent to donation. This pattern creates an incentive for researchers to get access to fresh embryos before women can reflect and change their mind. But this pattern also speaks loudly against allowing or, worse, endorsing such a practice. We join others in insisting that final consent for donation to embryo research ought to be delayed 'until a significant time after IVF treatment', which would definitely preclude the donation of fresh embryos. 
